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Abstract—We address the physical layer security question of
whether a multiple antenna receiver can enhance the secrecy
rate of the multiple-input multiple-output wiretap channel by
transmitting artificial noise from some of its antennas to jam a
multiple antenna eavesdropper. To answer this question we use
a QoS-MMSE approach to formulate a global constrained opti-
misation problem that is efficiently solved after approximating it
by a semidefinite program. Results suggest that an improvement
in secrecy rate is possible by transmitting artificial noise from
an appropriately chosen number of the receiver’s antennas. We
introduce two antenna configuration selection strategies to reduce
system complexity and obtain the best secrecy performance.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, precoding, secrecy rate, multiple
antennas, physical layer security, wireless secrecy, semidefinite
programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study physical (PHY) layer approaches
to improve security in wireless systems, without relying on
upper-layer encryption to tackle the intrinsic vulnerabilities
arising from the broadcast nature of the wireless channel.
We address security in the multiple antenna wiretap channel;
specifically, we investigate how the transmission of artificial
noise (AN) by the intended receiver can improve the overall
security of the system.
There has been a remarkable increase in multiple antenna
signal processing approaches attempting to secure wireless
networks at the PHY-layer [1]. Optimal transmission strategies
for the multiple-input single-output (MISO) case have been
widely studied [2], while the multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) case has not received as much attention mostly due to
its complexity. The MIMO wiretap channel, also known as the
multiple-input multiple-output multiple-antenna eavesdropper,
was first studied in [3] and [4] where suboptimal secure
transmission strategies were introduced. A minimum mean
square error (MMSE) approach was used in [5]. More recently,
in [6] the transmission solution for the MIMO wiretap channel
was characterized for a full-rank input covariance matrix under
an average power constraint. The general transmit solution
that achieves the MIMO wiretap channel’s secrecy capacity
(CS) through alternating optimisation was introduced in [7].
All these papers have shown that generating AN from the
transmitter is counter-effective to enhance the secrecy rate
in the presence of one fully determined multiple antenna
active eavesdropper; i.e., its channel state information (CSI)
is available at the transmitter.
The aforementioned studies consider the transmitter as the
unique source of the jamming signal and not a different AN
source to potentially enhance the secrecy rate of the system.
This idea, originally proposed by Goel and Negi in [8], con-
sists of using ‘cooperative jammers’ as an alternative to gen-
erate AN [9]–[11]. However, cooperative jamming introduces
important confidentiality issues arising from relying on third-
party cooperative nodes that might behave maliciously [12].
Secure cooperation presents a technical challenge by requir-
ing both synchronisation between the transmission/jamming
parties and the availability of global CSI at all entities [13].
Moreover, in a practical network, the AN generated from the
cooperative jammers may interfere the intended receiver due
to the error-prone available CSI.
In contrast to cooperative jamming, in this paper we address
the question of whether the transmission of AN from the
receiver, known in the secrecy literature as Bob, can enhance
security in multiple antenna systems. This idea has recently
been suggested to secure a single antenna device’s transmis-
sion to a two-antenna receiver in the presence of a single
antenna eavesdropper [14]. We took this idea further in [15]
by considering that both the transmitter and the receiver can
jointly transmit AN to confuse a single antenna eavesdropper.
Here, we address the general case of the MIMO wiretap
channel and study the security performance of the joint AN
transmission when the eavesdropper is equipped with multiple
antennas. Our objective is to understand whether, and under
what conditions, joint AN generation can enhance the MIMO
wiretap channel’s secrecy capacity introduced in [7]. With
this objective, we formulate an optimisation problem that
seeks the transmission covariance matrices that maximise the
secrecy rate (RS) in a globally power constrained system.
Our results suggest that a remarkable improvement in the RS
can be achieved by generating AN solely from the receiver.
This strategy becomes particularly useful when the eaves-
dropper’s channel is better than the main link’s counterpart.
This scenario can occur when the eavesdropper is equipped
with a large number of antennas, when it experiences good
channel fading conditions or when it is located close to the
transmitter. Moreover, this technique, compared to cooperative
jamming, does not require an external party to generate the
AN; therefore, it reduces overall system complexity without
compromising confidentiality.
The security improvement resulting from AN broadcasting
by Bob is obtained by judiciously choosing the subset of
Bob’s antennas to transmit AN. This raises questions about
the optimal receiver antenna configuration and requires careful
criteria to partition the receiver’s antennas between reception
and AN generation. Unfortunately, this procedure introduces a
great level of complexity into the solution; hence, in this paper
we devise two practical criteria to choose the best antenna
configuration for the receiver.
II. SYSTEM AND SIGNAL MODEL
Following the standard wireless secrecy model, we name
the transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
as “Alice”, “Bob” and “Eve”. They are respectively equipped
with Na ≥ 2, Nb ≥ 2 and Ne ≥ 1 antennas. The MIMO
Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve channels are denoted by H ∈
C
Na×Nb and Ga ∈ C
Na×Ne , respectively. We account for
path-loss effect by setting H = r
−α
2
ab H˜ and Ga = r
−α
2
ae G˜a
where rab and rae respectively denote the Alice-to-Bob and
Alice-to-Eve distances, with α ≥ 2 being the path loss
exponent, and H˜ ∼ CN (0,σ2
H˜
I) and G˜a ∼ CN (0,σ
2
G˜a
I) are
the independent small-scale fading channels1.
Bob receives Alice’s signal and transmits AN at the same
time. So, he allocates Nr ≥ 1 antennas for receiving infor-
mation and Nn = Nb −Nr antennas for AN generation. We
denote the actual Alice-to-Bob channel by Ha ∈ C
Na×Nr ,
which is a submatrix of the full channel H consisting of
only the Nr channel vectors associated with the information-
receiving antennas. Similarly, we denote the Bob-to-Eve chan-
nel by Gb ∈ C
Nn×Ne which also takes into account the
path-loss effect due to the Bob-to-Eve distance rbe; i.e.,
Gb = r
−α
2
be G˜b where G˜b ∼ CN (0,σ
2
G˜b
I).
Alice transmits a signal vector s ∈ CNa , given by s =
w + ηa, where w is the information bearing vector using an
idealised Gaussian codebook with covariance matrix Cw =
E{wwH} and ηa is Alice’s AN vector with covariance matrix
Cηa = E{ηaη
H
a }. Likewise, Bob’s AN vector is ηb ∈ C
Nn
with Cηb = E{ηbη
H
b }. The AN transmitted by Bob is
cancelled at his receiving antennas by using self-interference
full duplex techniques [14], [15]. This can be understood by
noting that Bob can perfectly cancel the effect of its own AN
by making two reasonable assumptions: i) it has a perfect
estimate of the channel between its transmitting/receiving
antennas and ii) it knows exactly the AN that it broadcasts.
It is worth pointing out that we assume that both legitimate
transmission parties are aware of each other’s transmission
strategy; therefore, we let P =Tr{Cw}+Tr{Cηa}+Tr{Cηb}
denote the global transmit power. We should point out that
we consider a global power constraint for the sake of fair-
ness when comparing our system’s performance against the
1
a ∼ CN (α,Σ) means that a is a random vector following a complex
circular Gaussian distribution with mean α and covariance matrix Σ.
traditional wiretap channel where only the transmitter has
transmission power available (equivalent to the global power
constraint).
We assume that all the transmission parties’ CSI are per-
fectly available; therefore, the secrecy rate (in bps/Hz) is2
RS =
[
log2 det
(
INb +W1H˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
−
log2 det
(
INe +W2G˜
H
a CwG˜a
)]+
(1)
where we define
W1 =
{
H˜
H
a CηaH˜a + r
α
abσ
2
b INr
}−1
(2)
W2 =
{
G˜
H
a CηaG˜a + ρ
α
G˜
H
b CηbG˜b + r
α
aeσ
2
eINe
}−1
(3)
with ρ = rae/rbe, and σ2b and σ
2
e are respectively the AWGN
variances at the receiving antennas of Bob and Eve.
III. OPTIMISATION PROBLEM
We seek the information and AN (from Bob and Alice)
transmission covariance matrices to maximise the secrecy rate.
We consider the optimisation problem subject to a global
power constraint Pmax that can be written as follows
max
Cw0,Cηa0,
Cηb
0
RS , s.t. P ≤ Pmax. (4)
The problem (4) is hard to solve due to the non-convex
nature of the objective function in (1). Therefore, we introduce
a sub-optimal approach to approximate (4) by an efficient
solvable program.
A. A QoS-MMSE approach to maximise the secrecy rate
We consider an MMSE approach for Eve, which yields a
tractable pathway to study the performance. Although subop-
timal, this formulation brings up the advantage of providing
an answer to the question posed earlier in the paper with a
reasonable level of complexity. We introduce the metric R¯S
to obtain a suboptimal but tractable version of (4), and so we
approximate (1) as
R¯S =[
log2 det
(
INr +W1H˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− log2 (1 + SNRe)
]+
(5)
where
SNRe = Tr
{
G˜
H
a W2G˜aCw
}
(6)
is the signal-to-noise ratio at Eve after considering an MMSE
approach; i.e., Eve recovers the signal by using an MMSE
receiver beamforming vector to maximise her SNR. As in [16],
we consider the worst case for security; i.e., Eve is perfectly
aware of the transmission strategy given by Cw,Cηa and Cηb .
2[a]+ represents max{a, 0}.
We now maximise R¯S , and so we rewrite the problem in
(4) for R¯S by introducing the slack variable β as follows
max
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
,β
log2 det
(
INb +W1H˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− log2(β) (7a)
s.t. log2(β) ≥ log2 (1 + SNRe) (7b)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0, β > 1 (7c)
P ≤ Pmax. (7d)
The problem above is still non-convex, so we fix β > 1
to a given value. This is equivalent to introduce a Quality of
Service (QoS) constraint to set the maximum admissible SNR
at Eve. Therefore, the problem has to be solved iteratively to
find the value of β that delivers the largest R¯S . We use the
inequality
det (I+Σ) =
r∏
i=1
(1 + λi) ≥ 1 + Tr(Σ) (8)
where Σ  0, r = rank(Σ) and λi denotes the i
th positive
eigenvalue of Σ. The equality in (8) holds iff r = 1. Finally,
we arrive at the following maximisation problem
max
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
,β
1
β
(
1 + Tr
{
W1H˜
H
a CwH˜a
})
(9a)
s.t. Tr
{
G˜
H
a W2G˜aCw
}
≤ β − 1 (9b)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0, β > 1 (9c)
P ≤ Pmax (9d)
for a fixed value of β.
We now recast (9) as a semidefinite program (SDP) by
using the Charness-Cooper transformation [17]. Therefore,
we introduce the slack variable ξ > 0, define Cw =
C˜w
ξ
,
Cηa =
C˜ηa
ξ
and Cηb =
C˜ηb
ξ
and set
H˜
H
a C˜ηaH˜a + ξr
α
abσ
2
b INr = INr . (10)
Therefore, we obtain the SDP
max
C˜w,C˜ηa ,
C˜ηb
,ξ
1
β
Tr
{
H˜
H
a C˜wH˜a
}
(11a)
s.t. H˜Ha C˜ηaH˜a +
(
ξrαabσ
2
b − 1
)
INr  0 (11b)
G˜
H
a
[(
β − 1
Ne
)
C˜ηa − C˜w
]
G˜a +
(
β − 1
Ne
)
×
ξrαaeσ
2
eINb +
(
β − 1
Ne
)
ραk G˜
H
b C˜ηbG˜b  0 (11c)
Tr
{
C˜w
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηa
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηb
}
≤ ξPmax (11d)
C˜w  0, C˜ηa  0, C˜ηb  0, ξ ≥ 0 (11e)
where the linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) (11b) and (11c)
result from relaxing the equality (10) and using the definition
of W2 (from (3)) in (11c). Finally, ξ > 0 is relaxed to ξ ≥ 0
without consequence since ξ = 0 is not feasible for (11d).
The SDP in (11) can be conveniently solved by using solvers
based on interior-point algorithms such as SEDUMI [18].
TABLE I
BOB’S ANTENNA CONFIGURATIONS FOR Nb = 3.
Conf. Antenna 1 Antenna 2 Antenna 3
1 RX AN AN
2 AN RX AN
3 AN AN RX
4 AN RX RX
5 RX AN RX
6 RX RX AN
7 RX RX RX
RX stands for a reception antenna while AN represents an AN generating
antenna.
It is worth recalling that the SDP in (11) is solved for a fixed
value of β. Therefore, an iterative exhaustive linear search
algorithm as in [19] can be used to find the value for β that
delivers the largest R¯S .
1) Numerical Results: To illustrate the performance of the
technique we consider a numerical example in which Na =
Nb = Ne = 3. As a result, there are 2
Nb − 1 = 7 possible
antenna configurations for Bob as illustrated in Table I.
As explained in Section II, in order to determine Bob’s best
antenna configuration that delivers the largest R¯S , we need to
solve the SDP in (11) for each one of the 2Nb − 1 possible
channel configurations and then select the best one. This is
effectively done in Fig. 1.a which depicts the maximum R¯S
of the sixteen random channel realisations and the antenna
configuration number (from Table I) that attains it. The figure
shows that joint AN generation can enhance the security of
the system compared to the MIMO secrecy capacity CS [7]
that uses all of Bob’s antennas for reception. Also we see that
the best antenna configuration for Bob changes across channel
realisations. The power allocation depicted in Fig. 1.b suggests
that broadcasting AN from Bob is useful to enhance R¯S while
transmitting AN from Alice is not necessary.
Two main questions rise from these results: i) under what
circumstances is it convenient to transmit AN from Bob? ii)
what is the antenna configuration that Bob should use to
achieve the best security performance? We address these two
questions in the following by introducing two antenna configu-
ration selection criteria that will not only offer answers to these
two questions but also reduce substantially the complexity of
the transmission technique.
IV. BOB’S ANTENNA CONFIGURATION CRITERIA
Although the potential benefits of transmitting AN from Bob
are now clear, analysing all of the possible 2Nb − 1 antenna
configurations at the receiver to maximise R¯S is a cumbersome
task. Indeed, for each antenna configuration the SDP (11) has
to be solved. Therefore, a criterion to systematically choose
the best configuration is desirable. This is not a trivial task
due to the trade-off between using all of Bob’s antennas for
reception to enhance the transmission rate in the main link,
and increasing the number of Bob’s antennas devoted for
broadcasting a more directive AN to further jam Eve.
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Fig. 1. Fig. a. Secrecy analysis for 16 random channel realisations and Bob’s
best antenna configuration for rab = rae = rbe = 1 and Na = Nb =
Ne = 3. The black numbered dots represent the best antenna configuration
(see Table I) for each channel realisation. Fig. b. Power allocation for a global
power constraint Pmax = 5.
A. Degrees of Freedom Analysis
This criterion chooses the antenna configuration based on
the analysis of the degrees of freedom (DoF) of the three wire-
less channels involved in the transmission between Alice, Bob
and Eve. As pointed out in [6] and [7], the secrecy capability
of the wiretap channel depends upon exploiting the DoF of
HH
H −GaG
H
a ; indeed, the rank of the transmission covari-
ance matrix corresponds to the number of positive eigenvalues
of HHH−GaG
H
a . This implies that if HH
H  GaG
H
a then
achieving secrecy is not possible because the eavesdropping
MIMO channel is more capable that the main channel. In
this scenario, transmitting AN from Bob can deteriorate Eve’s
signal quality allowing a positive R¯S . As we consider AN
generation from Bob, we also take into account the analysis
of the DoF of Gb
H
Gb − Ga
H
Ga that gives the difference
between the channels that Eve sees for receiving the AN from
Bob and the information from Alice.
We analyse all the possible k ∈ [1, 2Nb−1] antenna config-
urations at Bob and consider the channels Hka ∈ C
Na×N
k
r and
G
k
b ∈ C
Nkn×Ne between Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Eve where
Nkr and N
k
n are respectively the number of Bob’s antennas for
reception and AN generation in the kth configuration. Denote
λki as the i
th positive eigenvalue of HkaH
k
a
H
− GaG
H
a and
let µkj be the j
th positive eigenvalue of Gkb
H
G
k
b −Ga
H
Ga.
Then we form two column vectors:
δka =
[
λk1 · · ·λ
k
i , 0, · · · , 0
]T
∈ RNt (12)
δkb =
[
µk1 · · ·µ
k
j , 0, · · · , 0
]T
∈ RNe (13)
which we combine into the matrix ∆ ∈ RNt+Ne×2
Nb−1
∆ =
[
δ1a δ
2
a · · · δ
k
a · · · δ
2
Nb−1
a
αδ1b αδ
2
b · · · αδ
k
b · · · αδ
2
Nb−1
b
]
(14)
for weight α < 1. This parameter α allows us to weight the
contribution of the eigenvalues corresponding to the differ-
ence between the AN and information received by Eve (δkb )
compared to those of the wiretap channel (δka). Subsequently,
we perform the sum of the column vectors of the matrix ∆.
This sum is now stored in a row vector δ¯1 all of whose
elements have been normalised by the maximum component
of δ¯1 and sorted in descending order. Vector δ¯1 effectively
represents the sorted channel configurations where the first
element corresponds to the antenna configuration that delivers
the best performance considering the DoF analysis presented
here.
B. Eigen-Transmission Analysis
The second configuration selection criterion is based on
the analysis of an eigen-transmission strategy for the max-
imisation in (7). Again we analyse all the possible k ∈
[1, 2Nb−1] antenna configurations at Bob; i.e., the k channels
H
k
a and G
k
b . Now, similar to the optimal MISO secrecy
solution in [2], we obtain a beamforming vector tk ∈ CNa
that corresponds to the principal eigenvector of the pencil(
INa +H
k
aH
k
a
H
, INa +GaGa
H
)
. Therefore, to simplify the
problem, we effectively enforce a suboptimal rank-one trans-
mission. We do not consider AN generation from Alice, a
strategy consistent with [2]–[4], [6], [7]. Then, Bob beamforms
AN over the principal eigenvector ηk ∈ CN
k
n associated with
the largest eigenvalue of GkbG
k
b
H
, considering again a rank-
one transmission covariance matrix. This strategy yields the
following secrecy rate
R˜
k
S = log2
(
1 +
ξPmaxr
−α
ab t
kH
H˜
k
aH˜
kH
a t
k
σ2b
)
−
log2
(
1 +
ξPmaxr
−α
ae t
kH
G˜aG˜
H
a t
k
(1− ξ)Pmaxr
−α
be η
kH G˜kb G˜
kH
b η
k + σ2e
)
(15)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1] defines the global power distribution between
Alice’s transmitted information and Bob’s AN. Then, we
maximise R˜S over ξ expressing this problem as
max
0<ξ≤1
(
σ2b + ξPmaxa
k
) (
Pmax(1− ξ)c
k + σ2e
)
σ2b [(Pmax(1− ξ)c
k + 1) + ξPmaxbk]
(16)
where we define
ak = r−αab t
kH
H˜
k
aH˜
kH
a t
k (17)
bk = r−αae t
kH
G˜aG˜
H
a t
k (18)
ck = r−αbe η
kH
G˜
k
b G˜
kH
b η
k. (19)
The power allocation problem in (16) can be efficiently
solved by linear search algorithms as in [20]. Finally, for the
kth configuration we store the maximum value of R˜
k
S in a
normalised decreasing-order vector δ¯2, similarly to what we
did for the normalised δ¯1. The first-element of δ¯2 effectively
corresponds to the antenna configuration that delivers the best
performance using the eigen-transmission strategy.
Remark 1: In the case where the resulting antenna config-
uration for either method is to use all of Bob’s antennas for
reception (Nr = Nb), then [7] offers the best performance due
to the sub-optimality of the technique in Section III-A.
Remark 2: When HHH − GaG
H
a ≻ 0, i.e., all the
eigenvalues are positive and non-zero, then broadcasting AN
from Bob is not necessary as it cannot outperform the MIMO
CS . In general, when the rank of the main channel is larger
than the rank of the eavesdropping channel (Na > Ne), there
exists an effective null-space, and thus the best configuration
is to use the full degrees of freedom of the MIMO channel
such that all Bob’s antennas are allocated for reception.
Remark 3: It is advisable to set a threshold τ ∈ [0, 1]
to define the channel configurations achieving a selection
criterion performance larger than τ to be considered in the
analysis. The two introduced selection strategies are based on
approximation mechanisms and therefore they are not totally
accurate, in particular, when the performance obtained from
different antenna configurations is similar. In this scenario the
differences between the elements within either of the vectors
δ¯1 and δ¯2 corresponding to these configurations are small
and could lead to not choosing the antenna configuration that
delivers the largest secrecy rate. As a countermeasure, it is
advisable (but optional) to set a threshold (τ ∈ [0, 1]) to in-
troduce into the analysis the channel configurations achieving
a selection criterion performance larger than τ . We recall that
the elements of δ¯1 and δ¯2 are ordered in descending magnitude
starting from 1; therefore we will consider the elements
larger or equal to τ that correspond to the selected antenna
configurations. For example, we could analyse the secrecy
performance offered by all the antenna configurations attaining
a performance larger than τ = 0.9. This procedure improves
the accuracy in selecting the best antenna configuration that
will be used to solve the SDP in (11) but it increases the
complexity of the strategy.
1) Numerical Results: We set Na = Nb = 3 and normalise
both the variance of the small-scale fading channel and the
noise power (i.e., σ2
G˜a
= σ2
G˜b
= σ2
H˜a
= 1 and σ2b = σ
2
e = 1).
The Alice-to-Bob distance is fixed to rab = 1 and the global
power constraint is set at Pmax = 5.
First, we investigate the joint AN technique performance
when the number of antennas at Eve increases. In Fig. 2 we see
that broadcasting AN from Bob is particularly useful when the
eavesdropping channel’s degrees of freedom increase. Indeed
when Ne < Nb our strategy is outperformed by the CS in
[7], and so allocating resources at Bob for AN generation is
useless. In contrast, when Ne ≥ Nb, broadcasting AN from
Bob is useful. Interestingly, joint AN generation yields best
performance at Ne = 4 because an eavesdropper equipped
with a larger number of antennas can mitigate the effect of the
AN thus reducing the effectiveness of an external interference.
We now turn our attention to the performance of the con-
figuration selection strategies and their savings in complexity.
As explained in Remark 3, in order to increase the successful
channel configuration selection rate (SCCSR) we consider a
threshold τ to analyse the configurations that potentially might
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deliver a larger R¯S . We also study how τ affects the secrecy
performance, the SCCSR and the associated complexity cost.
Fig. 3 shows that the eigen-transmission method is better than
the DoF analysis across all the values considered for τ in terms
of choosing the best channel configuration (SCCSR); however,
the associated complexity is considerably higher. It is worth
pointing out that we measure the complexity by calculating the
ratio between the number of channel configurations chosen by
the channel selection strategy above τ to the total number of
possible channel configurations; i.e., 2Nb − 1. Interestingly,
the eigen-transmission method outperforms CS even when
τ ≥ 0.9. This behaviour is not found with the DoF analysis.
To analyse the effect of the location of the eavesdropper
on security we consider a travelling eavesdropper moving in
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Fig. 4. Effect of the location of the eavesdropper on the average R¯S and the
probability of R¯S > CS when rab = 1 and Ne = 3. The values of τ for
DoF and eigen-transmission analysis has been set to 0.5 and 0.95 respectively.
a straight line from Alice towards Bob and beyond. Based on
a normalised Alice-to-Bob distance rab = 1, the Bob-to-Eve
distance (rbe) can be easily inferred from the Alice-to-Eve
(rae) one. For the sake of clarity, in Fig. 4 we only plot the
Alice-to-Eve distance, so Bob-to-Eve’s distances are rae =
0.25 ⇒ rbe = 0.75; rae = 1 ⇒ rbe → 0; rae = 1.25 ⇒ rbe =
0.25.
Fig. 4 shows the possible improvements in terms of secrecy
rate by broadcasting AN from Bob when Eve is moving as
described above. The gap between the maximal R¯S and the
MIMO wiretap channel CS is larger when Eve is closer to
Alice due to the positive effect of jointly broadcasting AN that
counters the smaller path losses that the eavesdropping link
suffers under this condition. This gap decreases for rae > rab,
meaning that it is not so useful to generate AN from Bob under
this scenario because the eavesdropping channel is already
poor due to large path losses because of Eve’s greater distance
from Alice. This behaviour is confirmed in the lower plot in
Fig. 4 where the probability that the R¯S achieved by the joint
AN strategy outperforms CS is almost unity for Eve close
to Alice. This verifies that the generation of AN from Bob
is particularly useful when Eve is under favourable channel
conditions compared to the main link. Fig. 4 also illustrates
the good performance of the DoF and eigen-transmission
strategies to select Bob’s channel configuration. Here again,
the eigen-transmission approach is the one that delivers the
best performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have answered positively to the question
whether receiver ‘Bob’ can enhance the secrecy of the multiple
antenna wiretap channel by transmitting artificial noise from
some of his antennas. Indeed, a judicious allocation of Bob’s
antennas can provide a larger secrecy rate compared to the
wiretap channel secrecy capacity obtained when Bob purely
receives transmitted information. We have also introduced two
low-complexity antenna selection techniques with minimum
impact on secrecy performance. Transmitting artificial noise
from the receiver is useful when the eavesdropping channel
has a greater capacity than the main channel.
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